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This study uses the first twelve waves of the British Household Panel Survey covering the 
period 1991-2002 to investigate the extent of constraints on desired hours of work within jobs 
and the degree of flexibility of the labour market for a sample of women. Our main findings 
are as follows. First, the largest movements in hours worked are observed for workers who 
change their jobs. Second, about 40 percent of the women in the sample are not putting in the 
hours they would like. Most of them (mainly full-timers) would like to work fewer hours at 
the prevailing hourly wage. Again, women who change job experience the greatest hours 
changes, especially if they are over- or under-employed. Third, there is evidence of hours 
constraints. The hours movements among quitters are up to 5 hours greater than the 
movements among stayers. Fourth, we do not detect systematic time trends in the relationship 
between hours changes and job changes. But there is some evidence that overemployed 
women find it increasingly more difficult to move towards their desired hours even after 
changing job. Fifth, the evidence on a flexible labour market is mixed. We find only partial 
support for the hypothesis that overemployed or underemployed quitters receive 
compensating wage differentials if the new job does not satisfy their hours preferences, as 
well as for the hypothesis that quitters get a wage premium when they end up moving to jobs 
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1. Introduction  
Are workers free to choose the number of hours they work in the jobs they do? The 
‘canonical’ labour supply model assumes that they are. It postulates that workers making 
decisions on which job to work in, and for how many hours per week, are faced with a 
parametric hourly wage rate (corresponding to their productivity in work) and have a free 
choice over how many hours per week to work (Pencavel, 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999). But various strands of labour economics research have suggested alternative models of 
hours choice where hours are fixed within jobs. Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992) analyse 
models where jobs are ‘packages’ of fixed hours-wage combinations.
1 The monopsony 
framework recently developed by Manning (2003) suggests that employer preferences will 
play a key role in determining hours of work in a given job, which also suggests that workers 
are constrained in choosing hours within jobs. In reality, we know that workers sometimes do 
change hours within a given job. But do they have full flexibility to do this in every case? 
And if not, what are the implications for labour market dynamics and for policy makers?
2 
Each employee’s freedom to vary the hours he or she works is a key assumption 
underpinning the concept of the ‘flexible labour market’. However, even if hours were 
completely fixed within jobs but mobility between jobs is costless, we would still expect 
workers to be located on their labour supply curve, i.e. at their most preferred level of hours 
given the market wage.
3 But if there are costs to moving between jobs, then workers will face 
constraints (at least in the short run) on the hours they can work. This has implications for the 
                                                              
1 Their analysis builds on earlier studies by Barzel (1973), Rosen (1976), Ham (1982), Moffitt (1984), and 
Lundberg (1985). For a recent survey, see Lang and Khan (2001).  
2 Little is known on hours flexibility for Britain. Two studies that have investigated the extent of constrains on 
desired hours are Steward and Swaffield (1997) and Bryan (2000). Using data from the British Household Panel 
Survey, they both find that a substantial proportion of male workers (Steward-Swaffield) and male and female 
workers (Bryan) are not putting in the hours they would like, with most of the dissatisfied workers wishing to 
work fewer hours per week. Both studies, however, abstract from the issue of how changes in hours, hours 
preferences and jobs affect wages.  
3 Most of the early studies that analysed labour supply under the assumption that workers face a wage-hours 
locus rather than a fixed wage rate have also assumed that workers may costlessly find a job that offers their 
preferred hours-wage combination.   2
interpretation of data on actual and preferred hours of work, rates of mobility between jobs, 
and for estimating models of labour supply.   
In this study, we use individual-level longitudinal data on women from the first twelve 
waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) covering the period 1991 to 2002 to 
analyse the extent of hours constraints within jobs. Our aim is to see whether changes in 
labour supply preferences produce much larger effects on worked hours when workers change 
job. Given the length of the panel, we also test whether the patterns are constant over time, or 
whether there are systematic trends in hours movements and job changes over time. We are 
particularly interested in checking if and how employees vary their hours in response to 
exogenous changes in the incentives to work a given level of hours, under the null hypothesis 
of complete flexibility in hours choice within the job. For this purpose, we use reforms to the 
tax and benefit system that changed the hours conditions for Family Credit in 1992 and 1995 
and the attractiveness of work through the Working Families’ Tax Credit in 1999 to test the 
‘canonical’ model of complete hours flexibility. Finally, we look at how changes in wages 
relate to changes in hours both within and between jobs. The idea here is that, in a labour 
market with tied hours-wage packages, constrained workers may be willing to sacrifice wage 
gains (even to face wage reductions) for better hours when changing jobs. Similarly, workers 
may accept jobs offering undesirable hours only if the corresponding wage gains are greater. 
A labour market with these features is arguably ‘flexible’.  
This research is likely to be relevant for the design of two major sets of employment 
related policies. One is employment protection and employment rights policies. If it is 
difficult to change hours of work within a job then the implication is that people who want to 
change their working hours (for example, because of their family responsibilities) may have 
to change jobs altogether. If employment rights are conditional on a certain length of tenure in 
the job, then these forced tenure breaks could negatively affect employment rights and 
conditions. In addition, if pay is partly determined by job tenure, such breaks could also  3
curtail lifetime earnings over workers’ life cycle. This could have clear implications for 
equality of treatment in the workplace, for example for mothers of young children. The other 
important area is the design of tax credit and benefit policies which specify a minimum 
number of hours of work per week as a precondition for entitlement to a given payment (for 
example, the Working Tax Credit, and the current pilot for the Employment Retention and 
Advancement Scheme). If hours are not flexible within jobs, then changes to the tax/benefit 
incentive to work a given number of minimum hours are likely to affect rates of job-to-job 
transitions for the affected groups of workers. 
In the next section we briefly describe the view of the labour market that underlies our 
empirical analysis and interpretation. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our main 
results on the relationship between job changes and hours changes, the role of labour supply 
preferences, patterns of changes in hours, jobs and labour supply preferences over time, and 
wages. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In the last twenty years, a number of theoretical models and empirical studies have suggested 
that hours of work cannot be freely changed within jobs, but are instead mainly determined by 
employer preferences.
4 Such studies begin with the observation that most jobs appear to 
permit only a limited variation in hours worked at the discretion of the employee (e.g., 
standard 9-to-5/five-days-a-week jobs and regular shifts). This indicates that fixed hours per 
week may be part of a package including the wage rate and other working conditions. If there 
is a locus of wage-hours combinations representing different jobs, then workers make their 
decisions subject to this constraint, and the wage would be endogenous.
5 This is not in line 
                                                              
4 See Lang and Kahn (2001) for a survey. 
5 Consistent with the notion that there is a substantial amount of rationing in hours, most of the above-mentioned 
(and other) studies of labour supply based on hedonic models (e.g., Rosen, 1976; Biddle and Zarkin, 1989; 
Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; Moffitt, 1984; Altonji and Paxson, 1992) find that hourly earnings are not 
independent of hours worked.   4
with conventional models of labour supply, according to which individuals face an 
exogenously given wage rate that is independent of hours worked, and freely choose hours of 
work subject to the resulting linear budget constraint.  
Given this unconstrained choice, labour supply has no implications for job mobility. 
Exactly because hours are freely chosen within jobs, hours do not have an independent effect 
on job choice when the wage is accounted for (Altonji and Paxson, 1988). Likewise, the effect 
of changes in labour supply preferences on hours will not be affected by whether a worker 
changes job. But if jobs are packages of fixed hours and wages, then overemployed or 
underemployed workers can change their actual hours of work more easily only if they 
change jobs. In addition, nonzero mobility costs (or any type of imperfection in the labour 
market) may prevent workers from moving to jobs with more desirable hours conditions. In 
this case, changes in labour supply preferences will lead to changes in actual hours only if 
workers can find a better package of hours-wage combinations.  
One way to check for the presence of hours constraints is to compare hours 
movements among workers who change job with movements among workers who stay in the 
same job from one year to the next. For this purpose we estimate hours-change equations of 
the following form: 
it it it it Z Q H ε δ γ + ∆ + = ∆ ,                  ( 1 )  
where  it H ∆  is the change in worked hours per week between time t-1 and t for woman i,  it Q  
is a dummy variables which is equal to 1 if a quit occurred between t-1 and t, and zero if there 
was no quit,  it Z ∆ is a vector of control variables (some of which are measured in terms of 
changes between t-1 and t, such as marital status and health, others are measured in levels at 
time t-1, such as education and age), and  it ε  is a residual. A positive estimate of γ  would 
suggest that workers who change job have greater hours changes than stayers. But this 
relationship cannot adequately inform us on the presence of hours constraints because it does  5
not account for individuals’ labour supply preferences. To test the hypothesis that changes in 
labour supply preferences can affect actual hours only if workers move to another job, we 
follow Altonji and Paxson (1992) and estimate hours-change equations allowing the effects of 
changes in hours preferences to vary depending on whether a quit has occurred, that is: 
, ) ( 1 it it it it it Z Q P H ε δ φ µ + ∆ + + = ∆ −                      (2) 
 where  1 − it P is a vector of variables measuring hours preferences at time t-1. A finding that φ  
is close to 0 and µ  is nonzero indicates that the effect of past preferences on hours is 
independent of whether we observe a job change, implying hours flexibility within jobs. 
Conversely, estimates of µ  close to zero and φ  nonzero support the hypothesis of hours 
constraints within jobs. If all jobs have different degrees of hours (in)flexibility and hours 
constraints exist for the whole population, then µ  and φ  are likely to have the same sign, and 
the sum  φ µ +  is expected to be greater than µ  in absolute value. The result that past labour 
supply preferences affect actual hours more for quitters than stayers can be seen as providing 
evidence that hours constraints within jobs are important. 
As argued above, hours of work may not freely vary within jobs. In addition, the 
labour market may have costs of mobility and imperfect information such that workers would 
not be able to move to jobs that offer the hours-wage combinations on the labour supply 
schedule or a hedonic hours-wage locus. However, the labour market could still be ‘flexible’  
in the sense that workers may be able to trade off changes in the desirability of worked hours 
against wage gains when they move across jobs (Altonji and Paxson, 1988). Specifically, in a 
flexible labour market we expect to observe that the effect of an increase in hours by quitters 
who were overemployed in their old job is to increase the wage gain required to induce the 
job change. Likewise, the effect of an increase in hours by job changers who were 
underemployed is expected to decrease the size of the wage gain upon quitting. Similar 
arguments hold when the hours constraints are in the new job.  6
The empirical specification used in the wage analysis follows that introduced by 
Altonji and Paxson (1988) and has the form
6 
| DOWN | | UP | ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1 0 1 ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + + = − − H H X W W t t β β β β   
t t t t OVER UNDER OVER UNDER 7 6 1 5 1 4 β β β β + + + + − −  
1 02 1 01 OVER   | UP |  UNDER | UP | − − ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + t t H H α α         (3) 
1 04 1 03 OVER   | DOWN |  UNDER | DOWN | − − ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + t t H H α α  
t t H H OVER   | UP |  UNDER | UP | 12 11 ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + α α  
, OVER   | DOWN |  UNDER | DOWN | 14 13 t t H H ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + α α  
where  t W  is the hourly wage measured at time t, and X is a vector of controls for education, 
work experience, race, changes in marital and health status, changes in union status and local 
unemployment rate, number of and changes in the number of children, and a set of year 
dummies.
7 The variable  | UP | ⋅ ∆H  is equal to the change in hours given that the hours change 
is positive and zero if the change in hours is negative, while the variable  | DOWN | ⋅ ∆H  is 
equal to the absolute value of the change in hours if the change is negative and zero if the 
change in hours is positive. These two variables allow the effect of increases in hours to be 
different from the effect of hours reductions  ). ( 3 2 β β ≠  The terms  j UNDER and  j OVER (j=t, 
t-1) are indicators of whether the difference between actual and desired hours in each period j 
are positive or negative. Finally, the variables related to parameters  01 α - 14 α are meant to 
capture the hours-wage tradeoffs and the flexibility of the labour market. Basically, after a 
quit, a change in hours that tightens the constraint on the initial job should be associated with 
a larger wage gain, and similarly a change in hours that tightens the constraint on the new job 
should be associated with a larger wage gain. For example, in a flexible labour market, 
women who reduce their hours of work when initially they wanted to work more should have 
a larger wage gain  0). ( 03 > α  The lack of this effect is evidence of tied hours-wage packages. 
Similarly, individuals who increase their hours when moving into a job where they want to 
                                                              
6 For simplicity, we drop the individual subscript from all variables. 
7 Changes in the variables in the vector X are measured between t-1 and t, while the other variables (such as 
education and work experience) are measured at time t-1.  7
work less should be compensated with larger wage gains  0). ( 12 > α  Using the same reasoning, 
the expected signs for the  01 α - 14 α parameters are:  , 01 α , 04 α , 11 α and , 0 14 < α  and 
, 02 α , 03 α , 12 α  and  . 0 13 > α  
Equation (3) refers to quitters only. Instead, as in Altonji and Paxson (1988), we 
estimate it over the sample of women who did and did not quit, which excludes those who 
were laid off. But we allow the coefficients on all variables (except those in the vector of 
control variables X) to vary between quitters and stayers. So the observations on stayers help 
us identify the effect of the control variables, such as education and marital status. 
 
3. Data 
The data we use come from the first twelve waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) collected over the period 1991-2002. Since Autumn 1991, the BHPS has annually 
interviewed a representative sample of about 5,500 households covering more than 10,000 
individuals. All adults and children in the first wave are designated as original sample 
members. On-going representativeness of the non-immigrant population has been maintained 
by using a ‘following rule’ typical of household panel surveys: at the second and subsequent 
waves, all original sample members are followed (even if they moved house or if their 
households split up), and there are interviews, at approximately one-year intervals, with all 
adult members of all households containing either an original sample member, or an 
individual born to an original sample member whether or not they were members of the 
original sample. The sample therefore remains broadly representative of the population of 
Britain as it changes over time.
8  
                                                              
8 Of the individuals interviewed in 1991, 88 percent were re-interviewed in wave 2 (1992). The wave-on-wave 
response rates from the third wave onwards have been consistently above 95 percent. Detailed information on 
the BHPS can be obtained at 〈http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/〉. The households from the European 
Community Household Panel subsample (followed since the seventh wave in 1997), those from the Scotland and 
Wales booster subsamples (added to the BHPS in the ninth wave) and those from the Northern Ireland booster 
subsample (which started in wave 11) are included in our analysis.  8
  Our estimation sample includes women who are at least 16 years old and were born 
after 1941 (thus aged at most 60 in 2002). We exclude any female who was long-term ill or 
disabled, and in school full time or self-employed in a given year. The sample includes 10,134 
women who have been observed at least two consecutive times over the sample period, of 
whom 2,197 are single and childless, 1,634 are lone mothers, 3,265 live with a partner and 
have no child, and 3,308 are married with children. Although only 10 percent of the women 
are observed in the same marital state for all the 12 years of the panel, about 40 percent of 
them are observed for at least 7 years in the same state. The resulting sample size, after 
pooling all available years for all groups of women, is 48,293 observations (8,920 and 17,081 
on single and married women without children respectively, and 6,137 and 16,155 on lone 
and married mothers).  
  Table A1 presents summary statistics of key socio-demographic characteristics of the 
four groups of women. There are some noticeable differences among them. Lone mothers are 
younger (aged about 30) than all the other women, and a larger fraction of them tend to have 
non-white ethnic origins. They are also less educated, more likely to be in social housing and 
have less work experience. Married women without children are instead older (aged around 
44), better educated (although the greatest proportion of women with university or higher 
degrees is observed for single childless women), more likely to be house owners and have 
greater work experience.  
Table 1 shows year-on-year labour market transition probabilities averaged over the 
whole period each woman has been observed. We distinguish five labour market states: ‘out 
of the labour force’ (labelled OLF, which includes unemployment) or nonwork, ‘mini-jobs’ 
(i.e., working 1-15 hours per week), ‘short-part-time’ employment (SPT, i.e., working 16-23 
hours per week), ‘long-part-time’ employment (LPT, i.e., working 24-29 hours per week), and  9
‘full-time’ employment (FT, i.e., working 30 or more hours per week).
9 The table reports 
transition probabilities for all women regardless of their marital status, as well as for women 
in the four marital states described before. There is high persistence in both nonwork and full-
time work for all women, especially those without children (either single or married).
10 For 
example, single women without children who do not work in any given year t have an 84 
percent probability of not working in year t+1. For the same group of women, full-time 
workers in year t have a 91 percent probability of staying in the same labour market state. In 
comparison, lone and married mothers show a slightly greater degree of mobility. Persistence 
rates are much lower in mini-jobs and part-time employment, suggesting that these are more 
transitional labour market states. For instance, women in LPT jobs have only a 42 percent 
probability of remaining in long-part-time employment. They are much more likely to change 
labour market status, with a 19 percent probability they will move into SPT employment and 
a 26 percent probability they will move into full-time jobs. Clearly, women in mini-jobs and 
part-time work are more likely to change their labour market commitments in the next year 
than are women who work full-time or are out of the labour market entirely. Irrespective of 
marital status, more-educated women are generally more mobility at all levels of labour 
market involvement except in the case of full-time employment (Tables A3 and A4).
11  
Table 1 also reports the average change in hours of work from one year to the next for 
all women in each labour market state. To isolate the hours effect of different types of 
                                                             
9 These labour force states are based on a measure of weekly hours of work that includes usual worked hours as 
well as usual overtime hours. Table A2 reports average worked hours for all workers in each labour market states 
and for women in each marital status. Mean weekly hours for all women in employment are 31, they are 10 for 
women in mini-jobs, 19 for women in SPT, 26 for women in LPT, and 40 for women in FT (with almost 20 
percent of the whole sample or 35 percent of the full-timers reporting more than 40 hours per week). There are 
some clear differences in hours worked by women in different marital states. On average, single and married 
women without children work longer (about 34-35 hours per week in all employment states) while lone and 
married mothers work 7-9 fewer hours pre week. Interestingly, this difference is led by a greater proportion of 
childless women working full-time and not by large hours differentials within each labour market state. 
10 High persistence rates in nonwork and full-time employment have also been found by Booth, Garcia Serrano 
and Jenkins (1999). Our figures are also comparable to the annual transition rates reported in Gregg and 
Wadsworth (1995 and 1996). Similar transitions have been observed among American women by Blank (1989) 
and Francesconi (2002).  
11 Women are ‘more educated’ if they achieved A-level (or equivalent) qualification or higher qualifications. 
Conversely, ‘less educated’ women are those who achieved less then A-level qualifications.  10
transitions, we distinguish between changes that include zero hours (that is, staying or moving 
into nonwork) and changes that exclude them (that is, job-to-job transitions or moves from 
OLF to work). For transitions that originated from a job, we also report absolute changes in 
hours (again including and excluding transitions into nonwork), which allow us to gauge the 
extent of ‘hours churning’, that is the simultaneous existence of hours increases and hours 
reductions. For all women who were out of work, getting a job is associated with an average 
of 21 hours of work per week. For women who were already working, there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity along the labour supply. At one extreme, those who were in mini-jobs show the 
greatest positive hours increases (between 3 and 6 hours per week). At the other extreme, full-
timers show the greatest decreases (between 2 and 3 hours). In all employment states, we 
observe a great deal of hours churning from around 5-6 hours in the case of full-time 
employment to about 7 hours in the case of mini-jobs. Single childless women and lone 
mothers report the largest hours changes in all labour states except full-time employment, 
where the greatest changes are observed among single and married mothers.  
 
4. Results   
A. Job Changes and Hours Changes  
Table 2 documents a high turnover rate over the sample period.
12 Just over 20 percent of the 
women in the sample change jobs between two consecutive years, with a turnover rate of 
almost 23-24 percent for single women (with and without children) and 19-20 percent for 
married women.
13 In general, the largest changes in hours occur among women who change 
                                                              
12 Our measure of job change does not include internal promotions or job changes within the same firm, but 
includes moves to other firms (either quits or layoffs). 
13 These figures are slightly greater than those reported in Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) and in 
Booth and Francesconi (2000), which however refer respectively to pre-1990 years and the first half of the 
1990s. Combined with the transition rates in Table 1, they imply average job durations that are shorter than those 
found by Burgess and Rees (1996) but are consistent with those discussed in Gregg and Wadsworth (2002). 
Turnover rates for the United States that are comparable to ours are found, among others, by McCue (1996) and 
Royalty (1998).   11
jobs.
14 Looking at all women in all employment states, the net hours change is about 0.3 per 
week among ‘stayers’ and 1 among ‘movers’, while the absolute weekly hours changes are 
almost 5 and 10 hours for the two groups respectively. This indicates substantial changes in 
hours (both up and down). Single women, and especially single mothers, show not only 
greater turnover rates but also greater hours variability. 
Although the average proportion of all women who change job is relatively stable 
along the labour supply, a lot of heterogeneity emerges across different groups of women. For 
example, while only 17 percent of lone mothers in mini-jobs change employer, about 29 and 
27 percent of those in LPT and FT do so from one year to the next. There is also a great deal 
of heterogeneity in hours changes both across labour market states and along the labour 
supply for all women regardless of marital status. For instance, women who stay in mini-jobs 
increase their weekly hours by about 4, while those who stay in full-time jobs decrease their 
labour supply by 1 hour per week. Similarly, women in mini-jobs who change employer put 
in extra 11 hours of work per week, and full-timers who change job reduce their supply of 
labour by 5 hours on average. This last finding provides some evidence of “regression toward 
the mean” in worked hours, with the largest increases at the bottom of the labour supply being 
observed among singles without children and the most substantial declines at the top 
occurring amongst married women with children.  
We repeat the same analysis in Tables A5 and A6 where we stratify the sample by 
education levels (low versus high education). Job changing patterns are relatively similar 
across more- and less-educated women, with roughly 20 percent of individuals changing job 
every year in both educational categories. Despite this similarity, hours changes are slightly 
greater for low-education women than for women with higher educational levels.
15  
                                                              
14 This confirms the results shown in Altonji and Paxson (1992) for the United States and Bryan (2000) for 
Britain. 
15 Although the extent of hours churning is comparable across the two educational groups, more churning is 
generally observed at low levels of labour supply among less educated women and in full-time employment 
among the better educated.   12
Table 3 summarises these results in the linear regression framework of equation (1), 
where we include a broad set of potential determinants of labour supply changes, such as 
changes in marital status and health, number and changes in the number of children, and 
controls for race, education, experience and year dummies (e.g., Altonji and Paxson, 1992). 
The table presents the estimates of  , γ  which refer to a dummy variable that takes value one if 
a woman changes job between interviews and zero otherwise, and are for the entire sample of 
women as well as for women distinguished by marital state.
16 We show results from two types 
of regressions, one in which the dependent variable is the year-on-year change in weekly 
hours of work, the other in which the dependent variable is the absolute value of the same 
change. As compared to stayers, women who change job experience an average increase of 
almost 1 hour of work per week, although the overall hours churning is about five times as 
large (panel 1). If we restrict our attention to workers only (panel 2), these figures go down 
only slightly. These estimates, however, conceal a great deal of heterogeneity across labour 
market states. At low levels of worked hours such as mini-jobs (panel 3), changing job is 
associated with almost 9 additional hours of work, while at high levels of labour market 
involvement such as full-time employment (panel 6), changing job leads to a reduction of 
labour supply of about 3 hours. This confirms the regression-toward-the-mean results found 
earlier. The relationship between job changes and hours changes is heterogeneous also across 
different groups of women. In general, lone mothers show greater hours sensitivity in 
response to changing jobs, although among full-timers the greatest and smallest declines are 
observed among married women without children and with children respectively.  
Both changing hours and changing jobs may be correlated with life-cycle 
considerations which have not been accounted for in the regressions of Table 3. For example, 
expectations about future wages or future constraints (e.g., changes in family responsibilities) 
                                                              
16 In the definition of job change here, we include both quits and layoffs (as in Table2). If we restrict the analysis 
to quits only, we find similar results.  
  13
could have substantial consequences on current labour market involvement. These 
intertemporal considerations may thus crucially interact with labour supply preferences, to 
which we now turn our attention.  
 
B. The Role of Labour Supply Preferences 
At each interview, the BHPS asks respondents whether they would like to work fewer hours, 
or more hours, or continue to work the same number of hours “assuming that they would be 
paid the same amount per hour”. We use this information to construct three labour supply 
preference variables for any given year of the sample period, labelled OVER (=1 if a worker 
would like to work fewer hours, and zero otherwise), UNDER (=1 if a worker would like to 
work more hours, and zero otherwise) and SAME (=1 if a worker would like to continue to 
work the same number of hours, and zero otherwise). For the whole sample of working 
women, more than 28 percent report being overemployed, almost 10 percent underemployed, 
and the remaining 61 percent report being satisfied with their hours of work.
17  
In Table A2, the average hours worked by all women who report being overemployed 
are about 39 per week as opposed to 20 for those who report being underemployed and 29 for 
those who are unconstrained. At different hours levels, the hours variation among the three 
groups of workers is negligible (except for the case of full-time employment). But as we 
move up the intensive margin, the proportion of women who would like to work more hours 
declines from 27 percent among those in mini-jobs to 4 percent among full-timers and, at the 
same time, the proportion of workers who would like to work fewer hours increases from 
                                                              
17 The differences across women in different marital states are not surprising. Women with children (especially 
lone mothers) are more likely to be underemployed, and women without children (especially those who are 
married) are more likely to be overemployed. Our figures compare well with those reported in the study by 
Bryan (2000), which uses data from two waves (1996-1997) of the BHPS. These are in contrast with the patterns 
for North American workers. For a sample of American men drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), Altonji and Paxson (1988) report that 27 percent of the men in the sample are underemployed and 5.5 
percent are overemployed. Using data from the 1985 Canadian Labour Force Survey, Kahn and Lang (1991) 
report that 32 percent of female workers would like to work more and 17 percent would like to work fewer hours 
at their present wage. The figures for Canadian men are very similar. See also Lang and Kahn (2001). 
  14
nearly 7 percent among mini-job holders to 40 percent among full-timers. To see the extent of 
persistence in hours preferences over time and how this may differ within and between jobs, 
Table A7 shows year-on-year transitions in the labour supply preference variables for stayers 
and quitters, both for all women and for women distinguished by marital state.
18 The table 
indicates a high degree of persistence in hours preferences for all workers, especially among 
the overemployed (OVER=1) and those who would like to continue to work the same number 
of hours (SAME=1). Perhaps, the most notable difference between stayers and quitters is that 
among stayers a relatively larger proportion of women remain overemployed and relatively 
smaller proportions of them remain underemployed or willing to continue to work the same 
number of hours. 
In Table 4 the three labour supply preference variables observed in any given year t-1 
of the panel are tabulated against the actual change in weekly hours worked between year t-1 
and t. This is done for all women as well as for women stratified on marital status measured in 
year t-1. The same exercise is repeated on the subsamples of women who stay in the same job 
(‘stayers’) and on those who change job from one year to the next (‘movers’). We draw 
attention to four results. First, all women, regardless of whether they are overemployed, 
underemployed or unconstrained, show a good deal of actual hours changes both up and 
down. For example, of the over-employed in t-1, 40 percent reduce their hours of work by 2 
or more hours per week the following year, and almost 25 percent increase their labour 
supply by the same number of weekly hours.
19 Similarly, among the underemployed, 44 
percent increase their weekly hours by 2 or more (for 21 percent of this subsample the 
increase is of 10 or more hours), while 29 percent further reduce their supply by 2 or more 
                                                              
18 The table refers to quitters only, and excludes workers who have been laid off. The differences between 
stayers and movers when layoffs and quits are lumped together are smaller than those reported in Table A7, but 
are qualitatively similar. For the breakdown of workers who changed job into those who quit and those who have 
been laid off, see Table A8 (comments below).  
19 Changes by one hour (up or down the labour supply) can capture measurement error, and so we consider them 
as if they were associated with no change. Table 4 shows that the proportions of workers reporting one less or 
one more weekly hour of work as compared to the previous year vary between 3 and 6 percent, and are fairly 
comparable across women in different marital states, types of job changing status, and labour supply preferences.   15
hours. Among unconstrained workers, about 29 percent increase and another 32 percent 
decrease their labour supply by 2 or more hours per week.  
Second, over- and under-employed movers respectively decrease and increase hours of 
work substantially more than their stayers counterparts. For instance, in the case of the 
overemployed in year t-1, 56 percent of those who change job reduce their labour supply 
between t-1 and t by 2 or more hours as opposed to only 36 percent of those who do not 
change job. This suggests that hours may not vary freely within jobs. Third, although smaller 
fractions of stayers change their labour supply between any two successive years, about 60 
percent of workers who do not change job (whether over-employed, under-employed or 
unconstrained) are observed to increase or decrease their labour supply by 2 or more hours, 
and for 20-25 percent this change involves 10 or more hours per week either up or down. This 
indicates that, even within jobs, there is some degree of choice over hours worked. Fourth, 
these findings seem to hold for all women irrespective of their marital status, although women 
with children tend to expand hours of work more than other women if they are 
underemployed (especially if they change job) and reduce their hours more if they are 
overemployed.   
In Table 5 we repeat the analysis of Table 2 after distinguishing workers on the basis 
of their labour supply preferences. On average, women who change job experience the 
greatest hours changes, especially if they are over- or under-employed. For example, movers 
in all employment states who are over-employed reduce their labour supply by about 5 hours 
per week on average, with a total hours churning of almost 10 hours per week. In the case of 
under-employed movers we observe an increase in average hours by more than 6 and a 
churning of 11 hours per week. Again, this provides evidence that the extent of hours 
variability within a job may be difficult. In addition, when we look at women in all 
employment states, the unconstrained movers (those for whom SAME=1) seem to face 
smaller changes as compared to stayers. But this hides a substantial heterogeneity at different  16
hours levels: unconstrained movers from mini-job experience large hours increases (about 9.5 
hours per week), while unconstrained movers from full-time employment experience large 
hours reductions (about 4 per week). Finally, the average hours changes among workers who 
stay in the same job are smaller than those among movers regardless of hours preferences, and 
vary relatively little (by at most 2 hours per week) across labour market states.  
To provide a better understanding of how hours constrains are distributed across all 
women in the sample, Table 6 reports descriptive probit models relating the overemployment 
and underemployment indicators OVER and UNDER to a set of demographic variables as 
well as to experience, job tenure and hours of work. The table shows that UNDER is 
negatively related to weekly hours (with one extra hour of work reducing the probability of 
being underemployed by 0.5 percent) and that OVER is positively related to hours (with one 
additional hour increasing the probability of being overemployed by 1.3 percent).
20 Blacks are 
9 percent more likely than whites to report overemployment, whereas Chinese women and 
women from other ethnic minorities are 8 percent more likely to report underemployment. As 
compared to single women without children, all other women are 2-3 percent less likely to be 
underemployed and 4-7 percent more likely to be overemployed. One additional child aged 0-
4 increases the chances of overemployment by 6 percent and reduces those of 
underemployment by almost 2 percent. Children in other age groups do not seem to affect the 
likelihood of underemployment but reduce the probability of being overemployed by 2-3 
percent. Family responsibilities (through marriage, or children or both) may thus give rise to 
hours constraints. While education does not have any systematic relationship with the 
probability of underemployment, higher educational qualifications are generally associated 
with a greater probability of overemployment. More experienced workers are less likely to be 
underemployed and more likely to be overemployed. This effect operates over and above the 
                                                              
20 These results are in line with those reported in Altonji and Paxson (1988, Table 1). Additional results on 
UNDER for a sample of prime-aged males from the PSID are in Ham (1982). 
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age effect which works in the same direction, with older women being less likely to be 
underemployed and more likely to be overemployed. The effect of a greater local 
unemployment rate is to increase the probability of underemployment and reduce that of 
overemployment, while the effect of longer job tenure goes in the opposite direction.
21 
Finally, to see whether job mobility is necessary if past hours preferences are to affect 
actual hours of work, we estimate equation (2) where  it Q (the dummy variables that records 
whether or not a quit occurred between t-1 and t) is interacted with  OVERt-1, UNDERt-1, and 
SAMEt-1 (with SAMEt-1 for stayers being the base). The results of these regressions are 
reported in Table 7. Before discussing them, we look at Table A8 which divides job mobility 
rates into quit and layoff rates by labour force state and marital status. This is important 
because equation (2) refers to quitters (and not to workers who have been laid off), and 
similarly the wage analysis presented below is performed on quitters. Table A8 confirms that, 
on average, job mobility involves about 20 percent of workers every year, with higher rates 
among lone mothers (especially if employed in long-part-time and full-time jobs) and lower 
rates among married women with children. Typically, 60 percent of the moves are quits, and 
the remaining 40 percent are layoffs.  
Turning to Table 7, we find evidence that both µ  and φ  are nonzero (except in three 
cases only, where the large standard errors may be a result of small sample sizes). All jobs 
therefore have some degree of flexibility regardless of whether individuals move across them. 
However,  φ µ +  is always significantly larger (in absolute value) than  . µ  This indicates that 
previous-period hours preferences affects actual worked hours more strongly when the job 
changes than when it does not. This in turn suggests that hours constraints within jobs are 
important.   
 
                                                              
21 Interestingly, our effects of tenure and local unemployment rate differ markedly from those in Kahn and Lang 
(1991), who found no effect from either variable.   18
C. Is There a Trend in Hours Movements and Job Changes over Time? 
Our analysis so far has not allowed for different time trends in hours changes among stayers 
and movers.
22 But the pattern of association of job changes with hours movement may not be 
constant over time, as it may interact with business cycle conditions that affect the 
opportunities to work a given level of hours through, for example, shifts of the demand for 
labour. The temporal relationship between hours and job changes may also vary as a result of 
special labour market policies that alter the whole budget set for specific groups of workers, 
such as low-income families with children after the changes in Family Credit in 1992 and 
1995 and the introduction of the Working Families’ Tax Credit in 1999. 
  To see how hours and job changes evolved over time, we repeated the regression 
analysis used for Table 3 and included a new set of interaction terms between the job change 
dummy and the time dummies in each regression of interest. The coefficients of such 
interaction terms are reported in Figure 1.
23 Panel (a), which distinguishes women by labour 
market state at time t, shows a fairly stable relationship between job changes and hours 
movements over time. The largest variation is observed among workers in long-part-time jobs 
(with a standard deviation of 1.59), and the lowest is observed among workers in short-part-
time employment (s.d.=0.50). For women in mini-jobs and LPT, hours changes tend to 
decline slightly, while among full-timers we observe a weak upward trend (that is, smaller 
reductions by 1-2 hours per week) after 1998, at the time of the introduction of the WFTC. 
Panel (b) shows the trends by labour supply preference. The time patterns for unconstrained 
and underemployed workers are fairly stable, although the positive relationship between hours 
and job changes for the latter group of workers increased more at the beginning and end of the 
1990s. The trend for overemployed workers is instead slightly increasing, with spikes in 1995 
(when an additional benefit for working 30 hours or more was introduced within Family 
                                                              
22 For instance, the regressions of Tables 3 and 7 ⎯ besides a set of demographic and socio-economic variables 
⎯ only control for year dummies, which pick up a time trend common to both groups of workers.  
23 Except for only few cases, most of such interaction terms are statistically significant at conventional levels.   19
Credit) and in 1999 (when the National Minimum Wage and the WFTC were introduced). 
This suggests that overemployed women may have found it increasingly more difficult to 
move towards their desired labour supply even after changing job.  
  Figure 2 breaks down the trends shown in panel (a) of Figure 1 by marital status. The 
relationships between hours and job changes in mini-jobs and short-part-time employment 
(panels (a) and (b)) have become more similar over time across women in all marital states. 
For both types of labour market involvement, the largest fluctuations are observed among 
lone mothers, although they seem to be correlated to neither macroeconomic conditions nor 
public policies that aimed at changing the incentive of working a given level of hours. Panels 
(c) and (d) show contrasting trends in long-part-time employment and full-time work. For all 
women in LPT (with the exception of single women without children), the variation in hours 
after changing job has declined over time, while for all full-timers it has increased. Again, 
lone mothers exhibit the largest fluctuations, but this time in the case of full-time work we 
observe spikes in 1995 and 1999.  
 
D. Wages  
As mentioned in Section 2, in a labour market with fixed hours-wage combinations, 
constrained workers may be willing to sacrifice wage gains for better hours when changing 
jobs. Similarly, workers may accept jobs offering undesirable hours only if the associated 
wage gains are sufficiently large. So far we have examined the presence of hours constraints 
by looking at labour supply, hours preferences and job mobility. To see whether there are tied 
hours-wage packages and the extent to which the labour market is flexible, we now turn to 
wages.  
Table 8 shows hourly pay averaged over the whole sample period for women stratified 
by labour force status and marital status. The table distinguishes workers who do not change 
job from workers who change job, and these are further distinguished into those who quit and  20
those who are laid off. Considering women in all employment states who do not change job, 
we see that their average hourly pay is £7.45. The corresponding wage for movers is £7.14, 
which is in between the figures of £7.54 and £6.46 for quitters and workers who are have been 
laid off respectively. Quitting a full-time job is associated with a small wage gain (of 2.5 
percent) as compared to not moving, while moving from other jobs is associated with almost 
no gain or, as in the case of mini-jobs, a small penalty (of 4 percent). The hourly pay 
associated with a job after a layoff is instead substantially lower than the wage received by 
stayers or quitters. In addition, stayers enjoy greater wage growth as compared to both types 
of movers. With only few exceptions, this same picture emerges for women in different 
marital states. Therefore, immobile workers in our sample receive wages that are similar to 
those received by quitters (especially if they were in full-time and part-time jobs) and greater 
than those received by workers who had been laid off, and face greater wage gains overall.
24 
  Tables 9 and 10 show the OLS estimates of equation (3) for stayers and quitters, 
respectively. In both tables, we report the results from five different specifications (columns 
[1]-[5]), which increasingly add hours and constraints variables, and White t-statistics that 
account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation across observations on the same 
individual. We begin with the results for quitters (Table 10). The main findings can be 
summarised as follows. 
1. Wage gains for quitters. Across all five specifications, job mobility is never 
associated with wage gains. For example, from column [5], having changed job leads to a 
wage penalty of 1.4 percent. However, none of the estimates is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.
25  
                                                              
24 These results are similar to those found by Light and McGarry (1998) for young white men drawn the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. 
25 Altonji and Paxson (1988) find instead a small positive effect of changing job on wage growth. But in their 
case too this effect is not statistically significant.  
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2. Compensating wage differentials for hours levels. We find evidence of a strong 
relationship between hours and wages when no constraints are taken into account (columns 
[1]-[3]): for example, in column [3], the coefficient of  | UP | ⋅ ∆H  is 0.008, and the coefficient 
of | DOWN | ⋅ ∆H  is -0.020. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. If we interpret these estimates as indicative of the hours-wage locus in a hedonic price 
model, they suggest that there is a positive trade-off between weekly hours and wages. If we 
take 30 hours per week as our base, the point estimates in column [3] indicate that the hourly 
wage for a 40-hour per week job would exceed the wage for a 20-hour per week job by about 
28 percent. This finding supports the notion of equalising differences (Rosen, 1986), and is in 
stark contrast with the results for men reported in Altonji and Paxson (1988). On the contrary, 
Table 9 reveals that there is a strong negative relationship between the wage change and the 
hours change for women who do not change jobs.
26  
3. Effects of overemployment and underemployment on hours-wage tradeoffs. 
Columns [4] and [5] report the effects of the interactions between hours changes and hours 
constraints. For quitters, we expect to find greater wage gains as a result of hours changes 
that tighten hours constraints on the previous job. Likewise, hours changes that relax a 
previous constraint are expected to be associated with smaller wage gains. In a similar 
fashion, hours changes that tighten (loosen) constraints on the new job should lead to greater 
(smaller) wage gains. The results in Table 10 are mixed. Only two of the eight interaction 
parameters have the right sign and are statistically significant  13 (α  and ), 14 α three parameters 
have the right sign but are imprecisely estimated  , , ( 11 01 α α  and ), 12 α  while the remaining three 
have the wrong sign, and one of them is statistically significant  ). ( 04 α
27 This evidence 
therefore supports neither the notion that overemployed or underemployed workers who 
                                                              
26 Clearly, these coefficients do not identify a wage-hours locus if there are packages of fixed hours-wage 
combinations which are not embedded in the labour supply model that guides our interpretation.   
27 The joint significance of the α01- α04 parameters (especially with specification [5]) is primarily driven by α04, 
which has the wrong sign.  22
change job receive compensating wage differentials if the new job does not accommodate 
their hours preferences, nor the notion that quitters get a wage premium when they end up 
moving to jobs that constraint their desired hours.  
The estimates in Table 10 suggest that the effects of increases in hours are not the 
same as the effects of reductions in hours, whether workers were constrained in the old job or 
in the new. But because only 12 percent of the observations are on quitters we may run into 
small sample size problems by including four separate interaction terms in each case. For this 
reason, we estimated specification [4] of equation (1) imposing the restriction that the 
coefficients on  , UNDER   | UP | 1 − × ⋅ ∆ t H  , OVER   | UP | 1 − × ⋅ ∆ t H  , UNDER   | DOWN | 1 − × ⋅ ∆ t H     
and  1 OVER   | DOWN | − × ⋅ ∆ t H  are the equal in absolute value. That is, 
. 0 04 03 02 01 α α α α α = = − = − =  We also estimated specification [5] imposing the restriction that 
all hours-constraint interactions on the new job have the same effect of wage changes 
), ( 1 14 13 12 11 α α α α α = = − = − =  as well as imposing the restriction of a common  . 0 α  The 
results of these constrained regressions are in Table 11, which shows only the coefficients on 
0 α  and  1 α  for quitters. From specification [5] the estimate  0 α  for the interaction of hours 
changes and constraints on the old job is 0.006, while the estimate  1 α  for constraints on the 
new job is 0.013. Both estimates are statistically significant, jointly different from zero and 
different from each other. These results, therefore, provide support for the hypothesis that 
workers receive compensating wage differentials when they change their work hours in some 
undesirable way. 
4. Effects on stayers. Table 9 shows the estimates on hours and constraint variables for 
workers who do not change job. Although it is generally assumed that hours and wages within 
a given job are fixed, preferences of employers and workers may vary over time. Firms may 
respond to changes in required hours or changes in required hours relative to changes in 
desired hours by workers with adequate wage adjustments. For instance, if workers wanted to  23
work less at a given point in time but were not allowed by their employer, they might receive 
greater wage gains if they were required to work more in subsequent periods. So, even within 
jobs, we would expect to observe hours constraints that affect the pattern of hours-wage trade-
offs. The evidence is again mixed. Four of the eight coefficients have the wrong sign, and 
only two are statistically significant. Therefore, not only is the extent of hours mobility much 
lower within jobs than between jobs, but also the way in which hours movements are 
rewarded within jobs does not seem to conform to the notion that workers will trade off 
changes in the attractiveness of worked hours with wage gains.  
  5. Effects by marital status. Tables 12 and 13 respectively report the estimates of 
equation (1) for stayers and quitters stratified by marital status. Two versions of equations (1) 
are shown, namely specifications [1] and [5]. Most of the results discussed above are found 
across all groups of women. Quitting does not lead to wage gains (except for lone mothers 
under specification [1]), although this variable is never precisely estimated (Table 13). For all 
women who change job, there is a positive trade-off between the wage and hours per week, 
while the trade-off is negative among stayers. So there is evidence of some compensating 
differentials for hours levels. But the evidence of compensating differentials for 
overemployment and underemployment on wage-hours trade-offs is again mixed for all 
groups of women (and for both quitters and stayers). Finally, Table 14 shows the estimates 
obtained after imposing the restriction that the effects of increases in hours are the same as the 
effects of reductions in hours for workers who are constrained in the old job or in the new job. 
They reveal that women in all marital states trade off changes in the desirability of work hours 
against wage changes when changing jobs. This is especially true for mothers (whether 
married or not) when the hours constraint is on the new job, and for women without children 
(whether married or not) when the constraint is on the old job.  
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5. Conclusion  
This study investigates the extent of constraints on desired hours of work within jobs and the 
degree of flexibility of the labour market, in the sense that workers may be able to trade off 
changes in the desirability of worked hours against wage gains when they move across jobs. 
In the empirical analysis we use longitudinal data from the first twelve waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey. Our main findings are as follows: 
•  The largest movements in hours worked are observed for workers who change their 
jobs. These range between 9 extra hours of work among women in mini-jobs and 3 
fewer hours among full-timers. Despite some differences, these relationships hold true 
for all women regardless of their marital status. 
•  About 40 percent of the women in our sample are not putting in the hours they would 
like. Most of them (mainly full-timers) would like to work fewer hours at the 
prevailing hourly wage. Again, women who change job experience the greatest hours 
changes, especially if they are over- or under-employed.  
•  If hours of work can flexibly vary within jobs, we would expect the effect on hours of 
past labour supply preferences to be the same for stayers as for quitters. But if 
employers restrict hours, we expect stronger responses among quitters. We find 
evidence of hours constraints. The hours movements among quitters are up to 5 hours 
greater than the movements among stayers. 
•  We do not detect systematic time trends in the relationship between hours changes and 
job changes. This suggests that, on average, the variation in hours due to job changes 
has varied little in response to exogenous changes in the incentives to work a given 
level of hours (e.g., the changes in hours for eligibility to Family Credit in 1992 and 
1995 and the greater attractiveness of work through the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
in 1999). There is some evidence however that overemployed women find it  25
increasingly more difficult to move towards their desired hours even after changing 
job. 
•  From the wage analysis, the evidence on a flexible labour market is mixed. Models 
imposing the restriction that the wage effects of hours increases are the same as the 
wage effects of hours reductions (regardless of whether workers were constrained in 
the old job or in the new) provide support for the hypothesis that workers receive 
compensating wage differentials when they change their work hours in some 
undesirable way. But from unrestricted models this is not true. From such models, in 
fact, we support neither the hypothesis that overemployed or underemployed workers 
who change job receive compensating wage differentials if the new job does not 
satisfy their hours preferences, nor the notion that quitters get a wage premium when 
they end up moving to jobs that constraint their desired hours. The different results 
may be due to small sample sizes and the lack of information on the size of hours 
constraint, and warrant some further research. 
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Note: Figures are coefficients (OLS estimates) on the interactions between time dummies and having changed 
job from one year to the next. The other variables included in each regression are listed in the note to Table 3.   29
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Note: See note to Figure 1.  
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Table 1. Year-on-year labour market transitions and average changes in hours worked 
 
 
Labour market state  
















          
OLF          
Stay in OLF    (%)  83.9 84.0 71.7  93.3  81.7 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  6.6  4.4  12.1 2.9 8.3 
Into LPT    (%)  4.0  2.9  7.4  1.4  5.2 
Into HPT    (%)  1.0  0.8  1.3  0.6  1.3 
Into FT    (%)  4.5  7.9  7.6 1.9 3.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  3.4  4.3  5.7  1.4  3.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  21.1  26.9  20.2  21.3  19.1 
Number of transitions  13,075  2,314  2,285  3,992  4,484 
          
Mini-jobs (1-15 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  13.1  20.6 19.2  11.6 9.2 
Stay in mini-jobs  (%)  55.2 42.7  47.9  62.9  57.5 
Into SPT    (%)  18.1  15.6 13.7  16.9 21.4 
Into LPT    (%)  4.1  4.3  3.6  2.8  5.1 
Into FT    (%)  9.5  16.7  15.7  5.9  6.8 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  3.4  4.8  4.9  2.0  3.3 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.1  9.8  9.1  5.7  6.2 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  5.5  8.7  8.1  3.7  4.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  6.6  9.7  9.2  5.0  5.7 
Number of transitions  5,443  700  1,003  1,383  2,357 
          
SPT (16-23 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  12.3  15.9  16.0  12.9  10.2 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  11.8  12.6  10.3  11.3  12.4 
Stay in SPT    (%)  52.2 41.8 48.0  54.4  54.2 
Into LPT    (%)  10.5  9.4  7.7  10.2  11.7 
Into FT    (%)  13.3 20.3 18.0  11.3 11.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -0.2  0.4  0.2  -0.7  -0.2 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.7  8.9  8.4  6.3  5.9 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  2.4  4.0  3.8  2.0  1.9 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.0  7.0  6.4  4.4  4.5 
Number of transitions  6,029  605  815  1,759  2,850 
          
LPT (24-29 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  7.5  9.5  12.2  6.5  6.8 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  5.4  7.8  4.2  4.4  5.8 
Into in SPT    (%)  19.4  13.6  22.7  18.6  20.6 
Stay in LPT    (%)  42.3  33.5  31.1 48.0 42.7 
Into FT    (%)  25.5  35.6  29.7 22.6 24.1 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -1.1  -0.1  -1.9  -1.0  -1.2 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.6  8.7  8.2  5.8  6.4 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  0.9  2.6  1.4  0.7  0.5 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.1  6.9  5.8  4.4  5.0 
Number of transitions  3,024  346  286  975  1,417 
          
FT (30+ hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  2.6  2.4  3.1  2.2  3.3 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  1.9  1.4  1.9  1.5  3.0 
Into in SPT    (%)  4.3 2.7 6.5  3.8 6.1  32
Into LPT    (%)  3.8  2.1  4.1  3.5 5.9 
Stay in FT    (%)  87.4 91.4 84.4  89.0  81.7 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -2.7  -2.2  -2.9  -2.5  -3.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.1  5.7  6.6  5.6  7.1 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -1.8  -1.3  -1.9  -1.7  -2.4 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.3  5.0  5.7  4.9  6.0 
Number of transitions  20,624  4,936  1,739  8,930  5,019 
          
N 9,863  1,910  1,853  3,153  2,947 
          
Note: OLF = out of the labour force; SPT = short-hour part-time job; LPT = long-hour part-time job; FT = 
full-time job; N = number of women; “Hours change (incl. zeros)” is the average change in weekly hours 
of work including cases with zero hours (OLF) in the destination state; “Hours change (excl. zeros)” is the 
average change in weekly hours of work for women who are in the labour market (and report positive 
hours) in the destination period. Definitions are based on total weekly hours of work (usual hours plus 
overtime hours). Figures in bold denote the largest proportion of transitions for each labour market state; 
figures in bold and italics denote the second largest proportion of transitions. All figures (except for hours) 
are percentages and come from year-on-year transition matrices computed over the period 1991-2002 (so 
each woman contributes with 11 transition matrices at most) and averaged over time. They indicate row 
percentages. Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Women’s marital status is measured at the 
origin period.  
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2002. 
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Origin labour market state  
















          
All employment states            
Stayers     (%)  79.5 77.5  76.4 81.3  79.7 
Hours change
a  0.3 0.5  1.9  -0.2  0.2 
Abs. hours change
a 4.8  5.7  7.8  4.0  5.0 
Movers   (%)  20.5 22.5  23.6  18.7  20.3 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  0.9  0.7  4.2  -1.4  2.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.9  10.4  11.7  9.0  9.6 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  1.1  0.4  4.4  -1.2  2.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.8  10.4  11.8  8.9  9.5 
Mini-jobs            
Stayers     (%)  79.5 77.6  83.1 82.5  76.7 
Hours change
a  3.9 6.6  6.3 2.5  3.1 
Abs. hours change  5.1  7.6  7.7  3.9  4.3 
Movers   (%)  20.5 22.4  16.9  17.5  23.3 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  10.6  13.9  14.9  8.6  9.1 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  11.4  14.8  15.9  9.4  10.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  10.7  14.2  15.1  8.7  9.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  11.4  14.9  16.0  9.4  10.0 
SPT          
Stayers     (%)  80.0 73.1  77.5 82.8  79.1 
Hours change
a  1.8 2.7  3.3 1.4  1.6 
Abs. hours change    4.1  5.6  8.5  3.5  3.7 
Movers   (%)  20.0 26.9  22.5  17.2  20.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  4.2  6.3  5.0  4.5  3.1 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.8  10.3  8.0  8.0  7.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  4.3  6.8  5.1  4.7  3.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  7.7  10.1  7.8  8.0  6.9 
LPT          
Stayers     (%)  77.7 75.9  70.6 80.8  77.9 
Hours change
a  0.7 2.5  1.0 0.5  0.4 
Abs. hours change    4.1  6.0  8.2  3.3  4.2 
Movers   (%)  22.1 24.1  29.4  19.2  22.1 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  1.1  2.6  1.9  1.1  0.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.4  9.7  8.3  8.7  8.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  1.4  3.0  2.2  1.2  0.8 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.7  9.5  8.1  8.6  7.8 
FT          
Stayers     (%)  79.7 77.8  73.0 80.9  82.0 
Hours change
a  -1.0 -0.4  -0.8 -0.9  -1.6 
Abs. hours change   4.3  4.0  5.6  4.0  5.2 
Movers   (%)  20.3 22.2  27.0 19.1  18.0 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -5.1  -4.5  -4.9  -5.1  -6.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.8  8.4  9.3  8.5  9.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -5.0  -4.4  -4.7  -4.9  -5.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.9  8.3  9.1  8.4  9.5 
          
Note: For ‘Movers’ job changes are changes to another firm (and do not include promotions or job changes 
within the same firm, but include both quits and layoffs). ‘Stayers’ include workers who have been promoted. 
Figures in bold and italics are percentages For other definitions and sample sizes, see Table 1.  
a Excludes cases of zero hours by definition.  34
Table 3. The relationship between hours-of-work changes and job changes by labour force status and marital 
status (both measured in year t-1) 
 
 
Labour market state 
















          
1. All labour market states 
(including OLF) 
        




















N 41,290  7,594  5,061  14,837  13,798 
         
2. All employment states 
(excluding OLF) 
        




















N 30,347  5,738  3,167  11,486  9,956 
          
3. Mini-jobs          




















N 4,833  605  872  1,226  2,130 
         
4. SPT          




















N 5,165  511  633  1,532  2,489 
          
5. LPT          




















N 2,567  306  238  847  1,176 
          
6. FT          




















N 17,782  4,316  1,424  7,881  4,161 
          
Note: OLS estimates, dependent variable = ∆hours or abs(∆hours) (see equation (1)). Absolute t-statistics 
(obtained from White-corrected standard errors) are in parentheses. N = number of person-wave 
observations over which each regression is performed. Other variables included in each regression are: 
intercept, controls for education, work experience, race, changes in marital and health status, changes in 
union coverage status and local unemployment rate, number and changes in the number of children, year 
dummies. 
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Table 4. Actual changes in worked hours between years t-1 and t given labour supply preference in year t-1 – 
Percentages 
 
  Hours change between t-1 and t 
 Down  Same  Up 


















              
All                
OVERt-1 
(=1 if overemployed 
in t-1) 





































































































               
UNDERt-1 
(=1 if underemployed 
in t-1) 





































































































               
SAMEt-1 
(=1 if continue  
working same hours 
in t-1) 
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Note: Each row shows the distribution of women changing weekly hours of work between year t-1 and 
year t over the nine hours categories (figures are percentages). Rows may not add up to 100 due to 
rounding. OVERt-1 = 1 if the respondent indicated that she would like to work fewer hours “assuming that 
[she] would be paid the same amount per hour” in year t-1, and equals 0 otherwise; UNDERt-1 = 1 if the 
respondent indicated that she would like to work more hours “assuming that [she] would be paid the same 
amount per hour” in year t-1, and equals 0 otherwise; SAMEt-1 = 1 if the respondent indicated that she 
would like to continue to work the same number of hours “assuming that [she] would be paid the same 
amount per hour” in year t-1, and equals 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5. Hours-of-work changes by job changing status, labour supply preference and labour force state 



















All employment states            
Stayers                
OVER   (%)  29.3 27.8  20.7 33.1  27.9 
Hours change
a  -2.1 -1.8  -1.7 -1.7  -3.2 
Absolute hours change
a 6.0  6.2  6.3  5.2  6.9 
UNDER   (%)  9.0 10.4  18.0  5.7  9.8 
Hours change
a  0.7 1.1  1.4 0.6  0.2 
Absolute hours change
a 7.0  7.3  8.0  5.8  7.2 
SAME   (%)  61.7 61.7  61.3 61.3  62.3 
Hours change
a  -1.3 -0.9  -1.1 -1.2  -1.6 
Absolute hours change
a 5.4  5.7  6.7  4.7  5.7 
Movers                
OVER   (%)  27.5 26.6  18.2 31.9  26.7 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -5.0  -3.4  -5.9  -5.2  -5.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.7  9.7  10.9  9.1  10.2 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -4.9  -3.4  -5.3  -5.1  -5.4 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.6  9.7  10.4  9.1  10.0 
UNDER   (%)  12.9 15.6  18.5  9.1  13.3 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  6.1  5.7  7.7  6.3  5.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  11.0  10.6  12.6  10.7  10.6 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  6.4  5.9  7.7  6.6  6.0 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  10.8  10.5  12.6  10.6  10.4 
SAME   (%)  59.6 57.8  63.3 59.0  60.0 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  0.1  -0.7  0.4  -0.1  0.7 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.3  8.9  8.9  7.4  8.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  0.3  -0.4  0.6  0.0  0.8 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.2  8.8  8.8  7.3  8.5 
Mini-jobs            
Stayers                
OVER   (%)  6.8 6.0  6.6 6.2 7.7 
Hours change
a  2.3 6.1  1.4 2.1 1.7 
Absolute hours change
a 8.3  14.0  7.4  8.5  6.9 
UNDER   (%)  25.7 30.6  32.8 19.7 25.0   
Hours change
a  1.6 1.5  3.1  -0.1 1.8 
Absolute hours change
a 7.1  8.2  8.0  5.6  6.9 
SAME   (%)  67.5 63.4  60.6 74.1  67.4 
Hours change
a  1.5 2.5  2.3 0.8  1.4 
Absolute hours change
a 5.2  8.0  6.8  4.4  4.3 
Movers                
OVER   (%)  6.3 9.2  5.4 2.3  7.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  10.9  14.5  17.9  6.7  8.7 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  11.8  16.0  17.9  7.3  9.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  11.2  16.0  17.9  6.7  8.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  11.8  16.5  17.9  7.3  9.5 
UNDER   (%)  31.6 40.8  42.2 24.9  28.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  12.6  14.8  16.4  10.6  11.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  13.6  15.8  17.2  11.5  12.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  12.8  15.1  16.4  10.9  11.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  13.6  15.9  17.2  11.5  11.9 
SAME   (%)  62.2 50.0  52.4 72.8  63.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  9.5  12.7  11.0  8.9  8.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  10.3  14.2  12.0  9.5  9.4 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  9.5  13.2  11.3  8.9  8.6  39
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  10.3  14.3  12.1  9.5  9.4 
SPT          
Stayers                
OVER   (%)  12.2 12.7  11.2 10.7 13.4 
Hours change
a  -1.7 -3.7  -1.5 -1.9 -1.3 
Absolute hours change
a 7.1  9.8  8.1  6.7  6.6 
UNDER   (%)  11.5 16.9  19.8  7.9 11.0 
Hours change
a  1.3 3.2  2.2 1.9  -0.1 
Absolute hours change
a 7.8  8.9  8.8  8.0  7.0 
SAME   (%)  76.3 70.5  69.1 81.3 75.6 
Hours change
a  -1.7 -2.0  -2.7 -1.6 -1.4 
Absolute hours change
a 6.0  8.5  8.0  5.5  5.5 
Movers                
OVER   (%)  14.2 16.5  10.9 13.6 14.7 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  2.7  6.1  0.6  3.8  1.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.9  10.1  5.1  7.5  6.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  2.9  6.1  0.6  4.4  1.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  6.8  10.1  5.1  7.1  6.0 
UNDER   (%)  18.0 24.4  21.8 16.8 15.8 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  6.6  7.0  6.1  10.1  4.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.6  9.8  8.4  12.8  8.2 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  6.6  7.0  6.1  10.1  4.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.6  9.8  8.4  12.8  8.2 
SAME   (%)  67.9 59.1  67.3 69.6 69.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  3.9  6.6  4.2  4.2  3.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.5  10.9  7.0  7.6  6.8 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  4.1  7.5  4.6  4.3  3.0 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  7.4  10.6  6.7  7.6  6.8 
LPT          
Stayers                
OVER   (%)  16.1 11.1  11.3 18.8 16.1 
Hours change
a  -1.7 0.1  -4.3  -1.9  -1.6 
Absolute hours change
a 6.4  10.8  8.6  5.0  6.7 
UNDER   (%)  10.6 21.4  20.4  6.5  9.3 
Hours change
a  -0.2 2.2  -1.8 1.3  -1.9 
Absolute hours change
a 7.0  7.2  8.5  5.3  7.1 
SAME   (%)  73.3 67.5  68.3 74.7 74.7 
Hours change
a  -2.0 -1.7  -4.1 -1.9 -1.7 
Absolute hours change
a 5.9  7.5  7.7  5.5  5.7 
Movers                
OVER   (%)  19.6 14.4  10.6 21.3 22.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -0.8  0.5  -1.8  -0.3  -1.2 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.7  11.2  6.2  6.9  7.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -0.6  0.5  -1.8  -0.3  -0.8 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  7.5  11.2  6.2  6.9  7.4 
UNDER   (%)  16.9 35.6  24.7 16.5  9.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  3.3  4.1  2.1  7.8  -1.4 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.5  9.6  8.2  10.3  9.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  3.6  4.1  2.1  7.8  -0.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.3  9.6  8.2  10.3  8.9 
SAME   (%)  63.5 50.0  64.7 62.2 67.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  1.2  3.0  2.4  1.1  0.5 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.4  10.2  9.1  8.3  7.9 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  1.4  3.6  2.9  1.1  0.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.3  9.8  8.9  8.3  7.7 
FT          
Stayers                
OVER   (%)  42.0 34.8  36.2 43.8 46.8 
Hours change
a  -2.4 -2.0  -2.0 -1.8 -3.9  40
Absolute hours change
a 5.8  5.7  5.8  5.1  7.0 
UNDER   (%)  3.7 5.3  6.7 2.8 3.0 
Hours change
a  -1.1 -0.4  -3.7 0.4 -3.4 
Absolute hours change
a 6.1  5.8  6.4  4.8  8.6 
SAME   (%)  54.3 59.9  57.1 53.4 50.3 
Hours change
a  -1.9 -1.2  -2.1 -1.5 -3.3 
Absolute hours change
a 5.0  4.7  5.6  4.3  6.6 
Movers                
OVER   (%)  38.4 32.2  27.1 41.1 44.7 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -6.9  -5.1  -8.9  -6.1  -8.9 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  10.1  9.4  11.7  9.4  11.4 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -6.8  -5.1  -8.3  -6.1  -8.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  10.0 9.4  11.0 9.3  11.2 
UNDER   (%)  5.8  8.3  7.5  4.4  4.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -2.4  -1.7  -4.0  -0.8  -5.1 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.1  7.1  11.3  8.8  11.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -1.9  -1.3  -4.0  -0.4  -3.9 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.7  6.8  11.3  8.5  10.6 
SAME   (%)  55.8 59.6  65.4 54.5 50.4 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -4.2  -3.9  -4.6  -3.1  -6.1 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.9  7.8  8.8  6.8  9.6 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -4.0  -3.7  -4.5  -3.0  -6.0 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  7.8  7.7  8.7  6.7  9.5 
Note: OVER = 1 if the respondent indicated that she would like to work fewer hours “assuming that [she] 
would be paid the same amount per hour”, and equals 0 otherwise; UNDER = 1 if the respondent indicated 
that she would like to work more hours “assuming that [she] would be paid the same amount per hour”, and 
equals 0 otherwise; SAME = 1 if the respondent indicated that she would like to continue to work the same 
number of hours “assuming that [she] would be paid the same amount per hour”, and equals 0 otherwise. 
Figures in bold and italics are percentages. For other definitions, see Table 1.  
a Excludes cases of zero hours by definition. 
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Table 6. Determinants of hours constraints – Probit estimates 
 
 UNDER 
(=1 if underemployed) 
 OVER 














              
Intercept 0.163 
(2.41) 
   -2.513 
(35.15) 
    
Age group:               
25-34 -0.185 
(3.85) 
-0.023  0.208 
(5.40) 
0.069   0.263 
35-44 -0.131 
(2.20) 
-0.016  0.282 
(5.67) 
0.094   0.253 
45-55 -0.179 
(2.62) 
-0.022  0.275 
(4.86) 
0.092   0.217 
55 or more  -0.429 
(4.88) 
-0.043  0.244 
(3.41) 
0.083   0.093 
Ethnicity:              
Black 0.052 
(0.42) 
0.007  0.252 
(2.67) 
0.087   0.013 
Indian 0.182 
(1.17) 
0.027  0.075 
(0.62) 
0.024   0.011 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.072 
(0.31) 
0.010  -0.136 
(0.60) 
-0.041   0.003 
Chinese and other   0.462 
(3.67) 
0.083  -0.167 
(1.43) 
-0.050   0.009 
Marital status:               
Lone mothers  -0.122 
(2.06) 
-0.015  0.124 
(2.30) 





-0.034  0.140 
(4.18) 
0.045   0.376 
Married with children  -0.250 
(4.17) 
-0.031  0.210 
(4.14) 
0.069   0.319 
Number of dependent 
children aged: 
            
0-4 -0.122 
(2.96) 
-0.016  0.191 
(5.63) 




-0.001  -0.068 
(2.84) 




0.006  -0.083 
(2.96) 




0.019  0.157 
(1.63) 
0.053   0.010 
Education:              
Less than O-level/ 
GCSE (or equivalent) 
0.082 
(1.33) 
0.011  0.059 
(1.08) 
0.019   0.096 




-0.006  0.115 
(2.59) 
0.037   0.253 
A level (or equivalent)  -0.108 
(1.86) 
-0.013  0.098 
(1.94) 





-0.007  0.123 
(2.83) 
0.040   0.244 




-0.007  0.170 
(3.36) 
0.056   0.124 
Experience   -0.012 
(2.11) 
-0.002  0.022 
(4.45) 
0.007  14.90 
[10.29] 
Experience squared  0.0002 
(1.65) 
0.00003   -0.0004 
(3.59) 
-0.0001  328.11 
[412.34]  42
Job tenure  -0.015 
(4.66) 
-0.002  0.012 
(5.02) 




-0.005  0.041 
(37.76) 
0.013  31.05 
[13.88] 
Local unemployment rate  0.016 
(4.09) 
0.002  -0.014 
(3.97) 
-0.004   5.99 
[2.32] 
χ
2  1,780.6     1,869.2      
df   25      25       
P > F  0.0000     0.0000      
              
Note: N = 36,317; with 9.9 percent of the sample reporting UNDER = 1, and 28.6 percent of the sample 
reporting OVER = 1. Base is: aged 16-24, white, single without children, not disabled, with no 
educational qualification, and average experience and hours of work per week. Absolute t-statistics 
(obtained from standard errors adjusted for repeated observations on the same individual) are in 
parentheses. Figures in square brackets in the last column are standard deviations. 
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Table 7. The relationship between hours changes, job changes and labour supply preferences 
 
 
Labour supply preference 






Test of equality 
    











SAME   1.305 
(6.30) 
 
      











SAME   -0.512 
(1.00) 
 
      











SAME   1.731 
(2.83) 
 
      











SAME   0.241 
(0.69) 
 
      











SAME   3.001 
(8.78) 
 
    
Note: OLS estimates, dependent variable = ∆hours (see equation (2)). Absolute t-statistics (obtained from White-
corrected standard errors) are in parentheses. Under ‘Test of equality’ we report the p-value of the t-test that the 
coefficient for quitters is significantly different from the coefficient for stayers. The other variables included in 
each regression are listed in the note to Table 3, For all these variables except the intercept, coefficients are the 
same for stayers and quitters. Marital status is measured at t-1.   44




     Movers 
Stayers    All   Quitters   Laid  off 
 
 
Labour market state and 
marital status of origin 
 












Pay at t 
% 
change 
                    
All  women                    
OLF
b       £  5.75            
Mini-jobs  £ 6.20  -2.1    £ 5.74  -11.7    £ 5.95  -10.9    £ 5.56  -12.8 
SPT  £ 6.67  13.8    £ 6.23  8.0    £ 6.40  9.3    £ 5.92  5.5 
LPT   £ 6.75  10.5    £ 6.42  8.5    £ 6.78  10.1    £ 6.18  5.1 
FT  £ 8.03  6.5    £ 7.81  5.8    £ 8.21  7.2    £ 7.30  2.6 
All empl. states  £ 7.45  7.1    £ 7.14  5.7    £ 7.54  6.4    £ 6.46  3.9 
                     
Singles without children                       
OLF
b       £  5.70              
Mini-jobs  £ 4.99  -3.0    £ 4.85  -7.3    £ 4.79  -5.7    £ 4.92  -11.4 
SPT  £ 5.78  14.2    £ 5.24  9.4    £ 5.34  10.3    £ 5.11  8.8 
LPT   £ 7.10  18.5    £ 6.46  13.5    £ 7.22  14.8    £ 6.15  9.7 
FT  £ 8.01  5.7    £ 7.76  5.3    £ 8.13  6.1    £ 7.27  4.0 
All empl. states  £ 7.54  7.4    £ 7.22  5.9    £ 7.78  6.7    £ 6.69  4.3 
                     
Lone  mothers                     
OLF
b       £  4.96              
Mini-jobs  £ 5.11  2.5    £ 4.90  2.9    £ 5.05  3.5    £ 4.78  0.6 
SPT  £ 7.22  13.0    £ 6.44  7.7    £ 6.75  8.0    £ 5.98  7.3 
LPT   £ 6.23  17.5    £ 5.90  16.4    £ 6.11  18.1    £ 5.84  12.7 
FT  £ 7.25  6.5    £ 6.88  6.1    £ 7.04  7.0    £ 6.53  4.9 
All empl. states  £ 6.63  11.6    £ 6.25  7.4    £ 6.58  8.4    £ 5.92  5.0 
                     
Married without 
children 
                   
OLF
b       £  6.62              
Mini-jobs  £ 6.48  -5.2    £ 6.01  -12.4    £ 6.12  -11.5    £ 5.90  -13.6 
SPT  £ 5.96  12.6    £ 5.64  7.1    £ 5.48  7.4    £ 5.79  6.8 
LPT   £ 6.28  6.7    £ 6.02  3.8    £ 6.47  4.0    £ 5.88  3.2 
FT  £ 8.03  5.1    £ 7.89  4.3    £ 8.09  4.5    £ 7.56  4.0 
All empl. states  £ 7.49  5.6    £ 7.29  3.6    £ 7.63  3.8    £ 6.87  3.3 
                     
Married with children                       
OLF
b       £  6.13              
Mini-jobs  £ 6.77  -7.7    £ 6.14  -15.0    £ 6.35  -14.3    £ 5.68  -17.1 
SPT  £ 7.13  11.1    £ 6.73  8.2    £ 7.20  8.5    £ 5.89  7.8 
LPT   £ 7.10  9.8    £ 6.79  9.0    £ 7.16  9.9    £ 6.31  6.9 
FT  £ 8.30  9.6    £ 8.06  8.8    £ 8.28  9.6    £ 7.51  4.2 
All empl. states  £ 7.60  7.0    £ 7.23  5.6    £ 7.55  6.3    £ 6.46  5.1 
                    
Note: Pay figures are real hourly wages (deflated using the Retail Price Index, base=2002).  
a Figures are based only on changes to another job (and exclude promotions and moves out of the labour market). 
b Includes entries in all jobs (without distinguishing between type of labour force involvement). 
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Table 9. OLS estimates of change in wage equation parameters – Stayers  
 
 Specification 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
          
































































α11         -0.001 
(0.12) 
α12           -0.007 
(1.95) 
α13         -0.001 
(0.14) 
α14           -0.001 
(0.21) 
          
R
2 0.056  0.057  0.058  0.060  0.065 
N 28,418  28,292  28,269  28,269  28,269 
         
Joint significance levels (p-values)  of:         
β4-β5     0.007  0.042 0.131 0.172 
β6-β7      0.606 0.668 0.313 
α01- α04       0.005  0.001 
α11- α14         0.401 
          
Note: OLS, dependent variable = ∆ln(wage). Absolute t-statistics (obtained from White-corrected 
standard errors) are in parentheses. Other variables included in all regressions: intercept, controls for 
education, work experience, race, changes in marital and health status, changes in union coverage status 
and local unemployment rate, number and changes in the number of children, year dummies. Also 
included were interactions of all variables reported in the table with a dummy variable indicating that a 
quit occurred (reported in Table 10). 
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Table 10. OLS estimates of change in wage equation parameters – Quitters 
 
 Specification 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 











Quit interacted with variables on:            
































































α11       -0.006 
(0.66) 
α12         0.003 
(0.60) 
α13       0.015 
(2.15) 
α14         -0.026 
(4.33) 
       
Joint significance levels (p-values)  of:       
β4-β5    0.022  0.003  0.348  0.357 
β6-β7     0.219  0.275  0.031 
α01- α04       0.082  0.000 
α11- α14       0.000 
          
Note: OLS, dependent variable = ∆ln(wage). See note to Table 9.  
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Table 11. OLS estimates for the restricted hours-constraint interactions – Quitters  
 
 Specification 
Restricted parameter  [4]  [5] 





α1     0.013 
(7.69) 
    
Significance levels (p-values) of:     
 α0 = 0 and α1 = 0    0.000 
 α0 = α1   0.000 
   
Note: See equation (1) and text for explanation.   48

















        
Specification [1]         

















2 0.048  0.053  0.053  0.079 
N 5,412  2,817  10,928  9,274 
        
Specification [5]          

















































































































2 0.067  0.089  0.062  0.097 
N 5,411  2,672  10,928  9,271 
Joint significance levels (p-values) of:         
β4-β5   0.200 0.036  0.702  0.996 
β6-β7  0.590 0.072  0.513  0.109 
α01- α04 0.096  0.169  0.150  0.025 
α11- α14 0.243  0.007  0.313  0.298 
        
Note: OLS, dependent variable = ∆ln(wage). Absolute t-statistics (obtained from White-corrected 
standard errors) are in parentheses. Other variables included in each regression are listed in the note to 
Table 9 (see specifications [1] and [5] in that table). For each group of women, also included were 
interactions of all variables reported in the table with a dummy variable indicating that a quit occurred 
(reported in Table 13). 
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Specification [1]         








Quit interacted with variables on:         
















        









Quit interacted with variables on:          
















































































































Joint significance levels (p-values) of:         
β4-β5   0.392 0.959  0.713 0.662 
β6-β7  0.135 0.007  0.122 0.338 
α01- α04 0.000  0.290  0.028  0.099 
α11- α14 0.000  0.006  0.080  0.000 
      
Note: OLS, dependent variable = ∆ln(wage). See note to Table 12.  
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Significance levels (p-values) of:         
 α0 = 0 and α1 = 0  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.000 
 α0 = α1 0.000  0.008  0.001  0.000 
      
Note: See equation (1) and text for explanation. 
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Ethnic origin:         
White   0.964  0.925  0.978  0.957 
Black 0.019  0.033  0.006  0.006 
Indian 0.005  0.017  0.007  0.018 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.002  0.014  0.002  0.013 
Chinese or other  0.010  0.011  0.007  0.006 
Education:        
No qualification  0.192  0.157  0.274  0.176 
Less than O level/GCSE  0.075  0.110  0.092  0.118 
O level/GCSE (or 
equivalent) 
0.195 0.300 0.198 0.263 
A level (or equivalent)  0.165  0.177  0.095  0.107 
Higher vocational 
qualification 
0.216 0.194 0.232 0.234 
University degree or more  0.158  0.062  0.109  0.102 
Number of children by age 
group:
a  
    












Housing tenure:         
Owner   0.614  0.535  0.832  0.767 
In social housing  0.224  0.366  0.106  0.181 
In privately rented 
accommodation 










        
Number of person-wave 
observations 
8,920 6,137  17,081  16,155 
Number of women  2,197  1,634  3,265  3,308 
        
Note: For convenience, the table does not report summary statistics on region (16 dummy variables). Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
a Averages are computed over the subsamples of lone mothers and married women with children. If computed 
over the three age-specific subsamples of mothers in each child group, the averages (standard deviations) are: 
1.173 (0.450), 1.347 (0.584), and 1.286 (0.526) for lone mothers, and 1.277 (0.440), 1.461 (0.632), and 1.296 
(0.513) for married women. 
b Computed over all women.  
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Table A2. Average weekly hours by labour force state, marital status, and labour supply preference 
 
Labour market state and  
















          





























































          





























































          





























































          





























































          





























































          
Note: Figures are mean hours of work per week. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The figures in 
italics are the number of person-wave observations.  
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Table A3. Year-on-year labour market transitions and average changes in hours worked – Low education 
 
 
Labour market states  
















          
OLF          
Stay in OLF    (%)  87.2 91.5  75.2 95.0 83.9 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  6.0  3.0  11.9 2.7 7.4 
Into LPT    (%)  3.4  2.2  6.2  1.1  4.7 
Into HPT    (%)  0.7  0.2  1.2  0.3  1.1 
Into FT    (%)  2.7  3.1  5.5 0.9 2.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  2.5  2.0  4.7  0.9  3.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  19.3  23.1  18.8  18.2  19.1 
Number of transitions  9,112  1,418  1,614  2,981  3,099 
          
Mini-jobs (1-15 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  13.7  20.1 21.0  13.0 10.0 
Stay in mini-jobs  (%)  58.8 52.8  50.7 65.4 58.5 
Into SPT    (%)  17.7  13.9 14.8  15.9 20.7 
Into LPT    (%)  3.8  2.8  3.0  2.3  5.3 
Into FT    (%)  6.1  10.4  10.6  3.4  5.4 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  2.2  2.3  3.3  1.0  2.7 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.0  7.6  7.7  4.9  5.8 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  4.2  5.6  6.3  2.9  4.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.3  6.8  7.6  4.0  5.3 
Number of transitions  3,065  288  501  930  1,346 
          
SPT (16-23 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  13.5 17.2  18.3 13.9 11.0 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  11.9  11.7  9.1  11.4  13.2 
Stay in SPT    (%)  54.7 48.4  53.6 57.0 54.3 
Into LPT    (%)  9.8  8.4  6.6  9.6  11.3 
Into FT    (%)  10.1  14.3  12.4  8.1  10.2 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -1.0  -1.1  -1.3  -1.5  -0.5 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.2  7.8  7.8  5.8  5.9 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  1.8  2.6  2.6  1.3  1.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  4.3  5.5  5.3  3.7  4.3 
Number of transitions  3,583  308  453  1,257  1,565 
          
LPT (24-29 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  8.3  9.4  15.3  6.3  8.2 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  4.3  6.8  4.9  3.7  4.1 
Into in SPT    (%)  19.5  14.1  21.5  19.5  20.5 
Stay in LPT    (%)  46.0 41.7  28.5  52.8 44.7 
Into FT    (%)  22.0 28.1  29.9  17.8  22.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -1.6  -1.1  -2.4  -1.6  -1.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.2  7.3  9.1  5.1  6.3 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  0.6  1.4  1.8  -0.0  0.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  4.5  5.4  6.1  3.7  4.6 
Number of transitions  1,708  192  144  631  741 
          
FT (30+ hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  2.9  2.5  3.9  2.5  3.6 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.6  2.7 
Into in SPT    (%)  5.0 3.3  6.4 4.8 6.3  55
Into LPT    (%)  4.7  2.7  4.8  4.5  6.7 
Stay in FT    (%)  85.4 89.7  83.0 86.7 80.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -3.1  -2.5  -3.6  -2.8  -3.9 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.0  5.7  6.7  5.4  7.2 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -2.1  -1.6  -2.3  -1.9  -2.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.1  4.9  5.5  4.6  6.0 
Number of transitions   8,701  1,896  765  3,813  2,227 
          
N 5,932  963  1,284  1,861  1,824 
          
Note: ‘Low education’ refers to having achieved less than A-level (or equivalent) qualifications.  
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Table A4. Year-on-year labour market transitions and average changes in hours worked – High education 
 
 
Labour market states  
















        
OLF        
Stay in OLF    (%)  76.4 72.2  63.3 88.2  76.9 
Into  mini-jobs    (%) 8.1 6.6 12.5 3.6  10.3 
Into  LPT    (%) 5.4 4.1 10.3 2.3 6.1 
Into  HPT    (%) 1.5 1.7  1.3 1.3 1.7 
Into FT    (%)  8.5 15.4  12.5  4.7  5.0 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  5.5  8.0  8.2  3.0  4.4 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  23.3  28.7  22.4  25.2  19.2 
Number of transitions  3,963  896  671  1,011  1,385 
        
Mini-jobs (1-15 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  12.4  20.9  17.5  8.8  8.1 
Stay in mini-jobs  (%)  50.6 35.7 45.0 57.8  56.1 
Into SPT    (%)  18.6  16.8 12.6  18.8 22.4 
Into LPT    (%)  4.6  5.3  4.2  3.8  5.0 
Into FT    (%)  13.8  21.4 20.7  10.8 8.5 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  5.0  6.6  6.5  3.9  4.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.4  11.3  10.5  7.3  6.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  7.1  10.9  9.8  5.3  5.3 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.2  11.7  10.8  6.9  6.3 
Number of transitions  2,378  412  502  453  1,011 
        
SPT (16-23 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  10.6  14.5  13.0  10.2  9.1 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  11.6  13.5  11.9  11.0  11.4 
Stay in SPT    (%)  48.5 35.0  40.9 47.6  54.1 
Into LPT    (%)  11.5  10.4  9.1  12.0  12.2 
Into FT    (%)  17. 9  26.6  25.1  19.3  13.2 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.4  0.3 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.3  10.0  9.2  7.5  6.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  3.3  5.5  5.1  3.7  2.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.9  8.6  7.8  6.1  4.7 
Number of transitions   2,446  297  362  502  1,285 
        
LPT (24-29 hours)           
Into OLF    (%)  6.8  9.7  9.2  6.7  5.2 
Into mini-jobs   (%)  6.9  9.1  3.5  5.8  7.7 
Into in SPT    (%)  19.2  13.0  23.9  16.9  20.7 
Stay in LPT    (%)  37.5  23.4  33.8 39.2 40.5 
Into FT    (%)  29.9  44.8  29.6 31.4 25.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -0.5  1.2  -1.4  0.0  -0.9 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.2  10.5  7.3  7.1  6.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  1.3  4.1  1.1  1.4  0.4 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.9  8.9  5.4  5.8  5.5 
Number of transitions  1,316  154  142  344  676 
        
FT (30+ hours)           
Into  OLF    (%) 2.3 2.3  2.5 2.0  3.0 
Into  mini-jobs    (%) 1.8 1.1  2.0 1.5  3.2 
Into in SPT    (%)  3.8 2.4  6.6 3.0  6.0  57
Into  LPT    (%) 3.1 1.7  3.5 2.8  5.3 
Stay in FT    (%)  88.9 92.5  85.5 90.8  82.7 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -2.5  -2.0  -2.3  -2.3  -3.3 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.1  5.8  6.6  5.8  7.0 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -1.6  -1.1  -1.5  -1.5  -2.3 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  5.4  5.0  5.9  5.1  6.0 
Number of transitions   11,923  3,040  974  5,117  2,792 
          
N 3,941  947  569  1,292  1,123 
        
Note: ‘High education’ refers to having achieved A-level (or equivalent) qualifications or higher 
qualifications.  
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Table A5. Average year-on-year job and hours-of-work changes by labour force state (measured in year  
t-1) – Low education 
 
 
Origin labour market state  

















          
All employment states            
Stayers     (%)  80.0 77.7  76.3 83.7 80.4 
Hours change
a  0.2 0.1  1.5  -0.1 0.4 
Abs. hours change
a 3.8  3.9  4.9  3.3  4.2 
Movers   (%)  20.0 20.3  23.7 16.3 19.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -1.0  -2.2  0.1  -2.4  0.4 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.0  9.6  9.3  8.7  8.9 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -0.8  -2.0  0.4  -2.3  0.7 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.9  9.4  9.1  8.6  8.8 
          
Mini-jobs            
Stayers     (%)  82.2 80.4  86.8 84.0 81.0 
Hours change
a  2.7 3.4  4.9 1.7 2.6 
Abs. hours change
a 3.9  4.7  6.1  2.9  3.8 
Movers   (%)  17.8 19.6  13.2 16.0 19.0 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  9.4  12.0  13.0  7.9  8.8 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  10.3  13.1  14.3  8.4  9.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  9.5  12.4  13.0  7.9  8.9 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  10.3  13.2  14.3  8.4  9.7 
      
SPT          
Stayers     (%)  79.8 75.5  78.7 82.9 81.1 
Hours change
a  1.4 1.5  2.3 1.0 1.5 
Abs. hours change
a 3.6  4.4  4.9  3.0  3.6 
Movers   (%)  20.2 24.5  21.3 17.1 18.9 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  2.8  5.1  3.4  2.8  2.2 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  6.8  8.5  6.7  6.8  6.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  3.0  5.5  3.6  3.0  2.4 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  6.7  8.3  6.6  6.7  6.4 
          
LPT          
Stayers     (%)  79.7 81.7  72.1 81.9 79.4 
Hours change
a  0.5 1.4  1.7 0.2 0.4 
Abs. hours change
a 3.5  4.3  5.1  2.9  3.7 
Movers   (%)  20.3 18.3  27.9 18.1 20.6 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  0.6  1.7  1.3  -0.6  1.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  7.8  8.9  8.4  7.4  7.6 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  0.8  1.7  1.8  -0.6  1.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  7.7  8.9  8.0  7.4  7.5 
          
FT          
Stayers     (%)  80.4 80.3  71.1 84.4 81.0 
Hours change
a  -1.0 -0.5  -1.1 -0.9 -1.5 
Abs. hours change
a 3.9  3.7  4.1  3.5  4.9 
Movers   (%)  19.6 19.7  28.9 15.6 19.0 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -6.3  -5.9  -5.4  -6.5  -7.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.7  9.3  9.0  9.5  10.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -6.1  -5.7  -5.0  -6.4  -6.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.5  9.1  8.7  9.4  10.4 
          
a Excludes cases of zero hours by definition.  59
Table A6. Average year-on-year job and hours-of-work changes by labour force state (measured in year  
t-1)– High education 
 
 
Origin labour market state  

















          
All employment states            
Stayers     (%)  78.2 76.9  76.8  79.6 79.7 
Hours change
a  0.3 0.8  2.3  -0.2 0.1 
Abs. hours change
a 4.9  5.0  6.0  4.6  5.0 
Movers   (%)  21.8 23.1  23.2  20.4 20.3 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -0.1  -0.3  2.7  -1.7  1.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.0  9.2  11.0  8.4  8.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  0.1  -0.1  2.7  -1.6  1.1 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.0  9.1  11.0  8.3  8.7 
        
Mini-jobs            
Stayers     (%)  77.1 75.5  79.8  80.9 74.2 
Hours change
a  5.4 9.1  7.8  4.1 3.8 
Abs. hours change
a 6.7  9.9  8.8  5.8  5.0 
Movers   (%)  22.9 24.5  20.2  19.1 25.8 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  11.9  15.0  16.2  9.9  9.6 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  12.8  15.9  17.1  11.1  10.3 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  12.1  15.3  16.7  10.1  9.6 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  12.8  16.0  17.3  11.2  10.3 
        
SPT          
Stayers     (%)  80.4 72.2  75.7  82.6 78.6 
Hours change
a  2.4 4.2  4.5  2.4 1.6 
Abs. hours change
a 4.9  7.0  7.2  4.8  3.9 
Movers   (%)  19.6 27.8  24.3  17.4 21.4 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  5.8  7.3  6.8  7.8  4.2 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.0  11.6  9.3  10.3  7.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  5.9  7.8  6.8  7.8  4.2 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.0  11.5  9.3  10.3  7.5 
        
LPT          
Stayers     (%)  73.0 63.5  69.0  79.7 76.9 
Hours change
a  1.0 4.1  0.5  1.2 0.4 
Abs. hours change
a 4.9  8.3  4.3  4.3  4.7 
Movers   (%)  24.0 26.5  31.0  20.3 23.1 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  1.7  3.5  2.6  3.2  0.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  9.2  10.5  8.2  10.3  8.5 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  2.1  4.1  2.6  3.6  0.4 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  9.0  10.2  8.2  10.1  8.2 
        
FT          
Stayers     (%)  79.2 76.8  75.8  79.7 82.9 
Hours change
a  -0.9 -0.4  -0.6  -0.9 -1.7 
Abs. hours change
a 4.7  4.2  4.7  4.5  5.5 
Movers   (%)  20.8 23.2  24.2  20.3 17.1 
Hours change (incl. zeros)  -4.2  -3.7  -4.4  -4.1  -5.0 
Abs. hours change (incl. zeros)  8.2  7.9  9.5  7.9  8.7 
Hours change (excl. zeros)  -4.1  -3.6  -4.4  -4.0  -5.0 
Abs. hours change (excl. zeros)  8.1  7.8  9.5  7.7  8.7 
        
a Excludes cases of zero hours by definition. 
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Stayers          
From OVER to:            
OVER  0.680 0.675 0.615 0.715 0.647 
UNDER
  0.018 0.019 0.046 0.010 0.023 
SAME  0.302 0.306 0.339 0.276 0.330 
       
From  UNDER  to:       
OVER  0.092 0.112 0.079 0.115 0.072 
UNDER
  0.408 0.403 0.430 0.392 0.411 
SAME  0.500 0.485 0.491 0.493 0.517 
       
From  SAME  to:         
OVER  0.182 0.194 0.147 0.196 0.169 
UNDER
  0.059 0.061 0.119 0.037 0.066 
SAME  0.759 0.745 0.733 0.767 0.765 
       
Quitters       
From OVER to:            
OVER  0.587 0.573 0.573 0.614 0.562 
UNDER
  0.049 0.064 0.064 0.032 0.059 
SAME  0.364 0.364 0.363 0.354 0.379 
            
From  UNDER  to:       
OVER  0.090 0.057 0.114 0.118 0.082 
UNDER
  0.464 0.507 0.456 0.432 0.460 
SAME  0.446 0.436 0.430 0.450 0.458 
       
From  SAME  to:       
OVER  0.135 0.132 0.113 0.145 0.135 
UNDER
  0.072 0.081 0.084 0.051 0.082 
SAME  0.793 0.787 0.803 0.803 0.784 
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Table A8. Quit and layoff rates by labour force state and marital status (measured in year t-1)  
 
 

















          
All states (including OLF)         
Quit 0.101  0.101  0.102  0.089  0.096 
Layoff 0.064  0.073  0.069  0.058  0.061 
Total 0.165  0.174  0.171  0.147  0.157 
         
All employment states          
Quit 0.120  0.124  0.134  0.112  0.122 
Layoff 0.085  0.103  0.102  0.075  0.081 
Total 0.205  0.225  0.236  0.187  0.203 
          
OLF            
Quit 0.029  0.035  0.048  0.013  0.030 
Layoff 0.009  0.009  0.014  0.004  0.010 
Total 0.038  0.044  0.062  0.017  0.040 
          
Mini-jobs          
Quit 0.140  0.144  0.107  0.137  0.155 
Layoff 0.065  0.080  0.062  0.038  0.078 
Total 0.205  0.224  0.169  0.175  0.233 
          
SPT         
Quit 0.129  0.178  0.145  0.111  0.125 
Layoff 0.071  0.091  0.080  0.061  0.084 
Total 0.200  0.269  0.225  0.172  0.209 
          
LPT         
Quit 0.131  0.138  0.154  0.130  0.126 
Layoff 0.090  0.103  0.140  0.062  0.095 
Total 0.221  0.241  0.294  0.192  0.221 
          
FT         
Quit 0.111  0.114  0.141  0.106  0.104 
Layoff 0.092  0.108  0.129  0.085  0.076 
Total 0.203  0.222  0.270  0.191  0.180 
          
Note: The sum of quit rate and layoff rate provides the total turnover rate. Both labour force state and 
marital status are measured in year t-1.  
 
 
 